From 8d9107e8c50e1c4ff43c91c8841805833f3ecfb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2007 16:53:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Revert "SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel" This reverts commit 9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0. It bit people like Michal Piotrowski: "My system is too secure, I can not login :)" because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux policies. As a result, quoth James Morris: "Can you please revert this patch? We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others. Sorry for the hassle." Cc: James Morris Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: Michal Piotrowski Cc: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index aff8f46c2aa..78c3f98fcdc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3129,19 +3129,17 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, /** * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet * @skb: the packet + * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels * @sid: the packet's SID * * Description: * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine - * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is - * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are - * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec - * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel - * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to - * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(). + * the external SID for the packet. * */ -static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 base_sid, + u32 *sid) { u32 xfrm_sid; u32 nlbl_sid; @@ -3149,9 +3147,10 @@ static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ? - SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid), + base_sid : xfrm_sid), &nlbl_sid) != 0) nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL; + *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid); } @@ -3696,7 +3695,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff * if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); else if (skb) - selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid); + selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid); if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) err = -EINVAL; @@ -3757,7 +3756,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 newsid; u32 peersid; - selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid); + selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid); if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { req->secid = sksec->sid; req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; @@ -3795,7 +3794,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid); + selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 8192e8bc9f5..e64eca246f1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid) netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr); if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) - rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid); + rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, + base_sid, + sid); else *sid = SECSID_NULL; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); @@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock) if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE && security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, - SECINITSID_NETMSG, + SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0) sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); @@ -293,32 +295,38 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, struct avc_audit_data *ad) { int rc; - u32 nlbl_sid; - u32 perm; + u32 netlbl_sid; + u32 recv_perm; - rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &nlbl_sid); + rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, + SECINITSID_UNLABELED, + &netlbl_sid); if (rc != 0) return rc; - if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL) - nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + + if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL) + return 0; switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: - perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; + recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; break; case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: - perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; + recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; break; default: - perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; + recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; } - rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, + netlbl_sid, + sksec->sclass, + recv_perm, + ad); if (rc == 0) return 0; - if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED) - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc); + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc); return rc; } -- 2.41.1