From: Alan Cox Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2007 13:51:05 +0000 (+0100) Subject: [SCSI] aacraid: Fix security hole X-Git-Tag: v2.6.23-rc2~164^2~24 X-Git-Url: http://pilppa.com/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=60395bb60e0b5e4e0808ac8eb07a92f6c9cdea1f;p=linux-2.6-omap-h63xx.git [SCSI] aacraid: Fix security hole On the SCSI layer ioctl path there is no implicit permissions check for ioctls (and indeed other drivers implement unprivileged ioctls). aacraid however allows all sorts of very admin only things to be done so should check. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Acked-by: "Salyzyn, Mark" Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c index d76e1a8cb93..c709dc8ad99 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c @@ -636,6 +636,8 @@ static int aac_cfg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static int aac_cfg_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; return aac_do_ioctl(file->private_data, cmd, (void __user *)arg); } @@ -689,6 +691,8 @@ static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg) static long aac_compat_cfg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; return aac_compat_do_ioctl((struct aac_dev *)file->private_data, cmd, arg); } #endif