From: Johannes Berg Date: Thu, 29 May 2008 08:38:53 +0000 (+0200) Subject: mac80211: clean up skb reallocation code X-Git-Tag: v2.6.27-rc1~969^2~337^2~64 X-Git-Url: http://pilppa.com/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=23c0752a25d73ccc4547700e8a57d5ae2f2edf56;p=linux-2.6-omap-h63xx.git mac80211: clean up skb reallocation code This cleans up the skb reallocation code to avoid problems with skb->truesize, not resize an skb twice for a single output path because we didn't expand it enough during the first copy and also removes the code to further expand it during crypto operations which will no longer be necessary. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index baa1be0671e..dac44cbd036 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -1215,6 +1215,45 @@ retry: /* device xmit handlers */ +static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct ieee80211_local *local, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int head_need, bool may_encrypt) +{ + int tail_need = 0; + + /* + * This could be optimised, devices that do full hardware + * crypto (including TKIP MMIC) need no tailroom... But we + * have no drivers for such devices currently. + */ + if (may_encrypt) { + tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM; + tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb); + tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0); + } + + if (head_need || tail_need) { + /* Sorry. Can't account for this any more */ + skb_orphan(skb); + } + + if (skb_header_cloned(skb)) + I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head_cloned); + else + I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head); + + if (pskb_expand_head(skb, head_need, tail_need, GFP_ATOMIC)) { + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: failed to reallocate TX buffer\n", + wiphy_name(local->hw.wiphy)); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* update truesize too */ + skb->truesize += head_need + tail_need; + + return 0; +} + int ieee80211_master_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { @@ -1222,6 +1261,7 @@ int ieee80211_master_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *odev = NULL; struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *osdata; int headroom; + bool may_encrypt; int ret; if (info->control.ifindex) @@ -1241,13 +1281,18 @@ int ieee80211_master_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, osdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(odev); - headroom = osdata->local->tx_headroom + IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM; - if (skb_headroom(skb) < headroom) { - if (pskb_expand_head(skb, headroom, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) { - dev_kfree_skb(skb); - dev_put(odev); - return 0; - } + may_encrypt = !(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DO_NOT_ENCRYPT); + + headroom = osdata->local->tx_headroom; + if (may_encrypt) + headroom += IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM; + headroom -= skb_headroom(skb); + headroom = max_t(int, 0, headroom); + + if (ieee80211_skb_resize(osdata->local, skb, headroom, may_encrypt)) { + dev_kfree_skb(skb); + dev_put(odev); + return 0; } info->control.vif = &osdata->vif; @@ -1509,32 +1554,26 @@ int ieee80211_subif_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, * build in headroom in __dev_alloc_skb() (linux/skbuff.h) and * alloc_skb() (net/core/skbuff.c) */ - head_need = hdrlen + encaps_len + meshhdrlen + local->tx_headroom; - head_need -= skb_headroom(skb); + head_need = hdrlen + encaps_len + meshhdrlen - skb_headroom(skb); - /* We are going to modify skb data, so make a copy of it if happens to - * be cloned. This could happen, e.g., with Linux bridge code passing - * us broadcast frames. */ + /* + * So we need to modify the skb header and hence need a copy of + * that. The head_need variable above doesn't, so far, include + * the needed header space that we don't need right away. If we + * can, then we don't reallocate right now but only after the + * frame arrives at the master device (if it does...) + * + * If we cannot, however, then we will reallocate to include all + * the ever needed space. Also, if we need to reallocate it anyway, + * make it big enough for everything we may ever need. + */ if (head_need > 0 || skb_header_cloned(skb)) { -#if 0 - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: need to reallocate buffer for %d bytes " - "of headroom\n", dev->name, head_need); -#endif - - if (skb_header_cloned(skb)) - I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head_cloned); - else - I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head); - /* Since we have to reallocate the buffer, make sure that there - * is enough room for possible WEP IV/ICV and TKIP (8 bytes - * before payload and 12 after). */ - if (pskb_expand_head(skb, (head_need > 0 ? head_need + 8 : 8), - 12, GFP_ATOMIC)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: failed to reallocate TX buffer" - "\n", dev->name); + head_need += IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM; + head_need += local->tx_headroom; + head_need = max_t(int, 0, head_need); + if (ieee80211_skb_resize(local, skb, head_need, true)) goto fail; - } } if (encaps_data) { diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.c b/net/mac80211/wep.c index 1e7f03dd8f6..c9fd1291b19 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wep.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wep.c @@ -93,13 +93,9 @@ static u8 *ieee80211_wep_add_iv(struct ieee80211_local *local, fc |= IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED; hdr->frame_control = cpu_to_le16(fc); - if ((skb_headroom(skb) < WEP_IV_LEN || - skb_tailroom(skb) < WEP_ICV_LEN)) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head); - if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(skb, WEP_IV_LEN, WEP_ICV_LEN, - GFP_ATOMIC))) - return NULL; - } + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < WEP_ICV_LEN || + skb_headroom(skb) < WEP_IV_LEN)) + return NULL; hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc); newhdr = skb_push(skb, WEP_IV_LEN); diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index d6635f6e561..9f6fd20374e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; int authenticator; int wpa_test = 0; + int tail; fc = tx->fc; @@ -98,16 +99,13 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) return TX_CONTINUE; } - if (skb_tailroom(skb) < MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_expand_skb_head); - if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN, - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN + TKIP_ICV_LEN, - GFP_ATOMIC))) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: failed to allocate more memory " - "for Michael MIC\n", tx->dev->name); - return TX_DROP; - } - } + tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; + if (!(tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) + tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || + skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN)) + return TX_DROP; #if 0 authenticator = fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS; /* FIX */ @@ -188,7 +186,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); - int hdrlen, len, tailneed; + int hdrlen, len, tail; u16 fc; u8 *pos; @@ -199,7 +197,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for IV/ICV */ info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; - return TX_CONTINUE; + return 0; } fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control); @@ -207,17 +205,13 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) len = skb->len - hdrlen; if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) - tailneed = 0; + tail = 0; else - tailneed = TKIP_ICV_LEN; - - if ((skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN || - skb_tailroom(skb) < tailneed)) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_expand_skb_head); - if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN, tailneed, - GFP_ATOMIC))) - return -1; - } + tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || + skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN)) + return -1; pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN); memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen); @@ -432,7 +426,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); - int hdrlen, len, tailneed; + int hdrlen, len, tail; u16 fc; u8 *pos, *pn, *b_0, *aad, *scratch; int i; @@ -445,7 +439,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP " * header or MIC fields */ info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; - return TX_CONTINUE; + return 0; } scratch = key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf; @@ -457,17 +451,13 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) len = skb->len - hdrlen; if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) - tailneed = 0; + tail = 0; else - tailneed = CCMP_MIC_LEN; - - if ((skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN || - skb_tailroom(skb) < tailneed)) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_expand_skb_head); - if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN, tailneed, - GFP_ATOMIC))) - return -1; - } + tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN; + + if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || + skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN)) + return -1; pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN); memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);