mac80211: minor code cleanups

Nothing very interesting, some checkpatch inspired stuff,
some other things.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
index 5824eb225f269329e6ce7a41ca7383c0e5859f1d..a2fbe0131312dcf23dda4b2ce8600af246f462f7 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
        p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
        for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
                p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
-                       sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i]?
+                       sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i] ?
                        sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
 
        p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n TX  :");
@@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
        p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
        for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
                p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
-                       sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
+                       sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
                        sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
 
        p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n SSN :");
        for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
                p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
-                       sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
+                       sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
                        sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->ssn : 0);
 
        p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n");

diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c
index ae62ad40ad63715bed2372be5344ce3c4e4889bc..ff39d893a113b04a5b4d7f13080ae1b23f5c3cfc 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/main.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/main.c
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static int __init ieee80211_init(void)
 
        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_info) > sizeof(skb->cb));
        BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ieee80211_tx_info, driver_data) +
-                    IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
+                    IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
 
        ret = rc80211_minstrel_init();
        if (ret)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
index 8013277924f2d75fca8acca678cbebb079c0f8a4..d3b6e1a648bd1ba9fa50904fc6b58c7ffd6ff41d 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
                                        size_t len,
                                        struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status)
 {
-       struct ieee80211_local *local= sdata->local;
+       struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
        struct ieee802_11_elems elems;
        struct ieee80211_channel *channel;
        u64 supp_rates = 0;

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h b/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h
index 01d64d53f3b9351ead2458fcebf2b1b5301a1f4b..ce099ea1d5d393e10d375a84aa98fe24835b58ed 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 
 /* Arithmetic right shift for positive and negative values for ISO C. */
 #define RC_PID_DO_ARITH_RIGHT_SHIFT(x, y) \
-       (x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y)
+       ((x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y))
 
 enum rc_pid_event_type {
        RC_PID_EVENT_TYPE_TX_STATUS,

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 39aaf210e9f56345cad6860d721bdcc413e0d12a..af6ce106469767890eebf2e226de65dfc65b47ee 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -26,10 +26,11 @@
 #include "tkip.h"
 #include "wme.h"
 
-u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
-                               struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
-                               struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
-                               int bar_req);
+static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+                                          struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
+                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                          u16 mpdu_seq_num,
+                                          int bar_req);
 /*
  * monitor mode reception
  *
@@ -1988,17 +1989,17 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
 
 static inline int seq_less(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
 {
-       return (((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1));
+       return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1);
 }
 
 static inline u16 seq_inc(u16 sq)
 {
-       return ((sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK);
+       return (sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
 }
 
 static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
 {
-       return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK);
+       return (sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK;
 }
 
 
@@ -2006,10 +2007,11 @@ static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
  * As it function blongs to Rx path it must be called with
  * the proper rcu_read_lock protection for its flow.
  */
-u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
-                               struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
-                               struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
-                               int bar_req)
+static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+                                          struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
+                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                          u16 mpdu_seq_num,
+                                          int bar_req)
 {
        struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
        struct ieee80211_rx_status status;

diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
index ca89a848c41e9d7da28c306c5fb40d56427d01bb..b22110a4a75e4b8d8f36efaf9dc43daaa93ad4a9 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int sta_info_insert(struct sta_info *sta)
        }
 
        if (WARN_ON(compare_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr, sdata->dev->dev_addr) == 0 ||
-                   is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
+                   is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
                err = -EINVAL;
                goto out_free;
        }
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_expire(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 }
 
 struct ieee80211_sta *ieee80211_find_sta(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
-                                         const u8 *addr)
+                                        const u8 *addr)
 {
        struct sta_info *sta = sta_info_get(hw_to_local(hw), addr);
 

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.c b/net/mac80211/wep.c
index f0e2d3ecb5c49d5ca1ac6b8752c67bcf48a2350d..7bbb98e846a3f1e26014b2b04f6a78dec35966ed 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/wep.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wep.c
@@ -49,17 +49,19 @@ void ieee80211_wep_free(struct ieee80211_local *local)
        crypto_free_blkcipher(local->wep_rx_tfm);
 }
 
-static inline int ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
+static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
 {
-       /* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
+       /*
+        * Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
         * key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3,
-        * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. */
+        * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them.
+        */
        if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) {
                u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff;
                if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen)
-                       return 1;
+                       return true;
        }
-       return 0;
+       return false;
 }
 
 
@@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 
-u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
+bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
 {
        struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
        unsigned int hdrlen;
@@ -276,16 +278,13 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
        u32 iv;
 
        if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))
-               return NULL;
+               return false;
 
        hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
        ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen;
        iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2];
 
-       if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen))
-               return ivpos;
-
-       return NULL;
+       return ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen);
 }
 
 ieee80211_rx_result
@@ -329,6 +328,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 ieee80211_tx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 {
+       int i;
+
        ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
        if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->skb) < 0) {
@@ -337,9 +338,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
        }
 
        if (tx->extra_frag) {
-               int i;
                for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
-                       if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) {
+                       if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) {
                                I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->
                                               tx_handlers_drop_wep);
                                return TX_DROP;

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.h b/net/mac80211/wep.h
index e587172115b8397acc0ce4f92d401e5b288101a4..d3f0db48314e11f00fed332a046798dcaeff4913 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/wep.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/wep.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
                          struct ieee80211_key *key);
 int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
                          struct ieee80211_key *key);
-u8 *ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
+bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
 
 ieee80211_rx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx);

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 3a20b036ef4c9b06a4301b51f56d3cdc636eca98..7aa63caf8d50c3c7c8b2b87b77b9a3515fd5a4ca 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
            !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
            !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) &&
            !wpa_test) {
-               /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC
-                */
+               /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for MMIC */
                return TX_CONTINUE;
        }
 
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 #else
        authenticator = 1;
 #endif
-       /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
-        * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
        key_offset = authenticator ?
                NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY :
                NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -91,9 +88,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
        struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
        int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0;
 
-       /*
-        * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it
-        */
+       /* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */
        if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)
                return RX_CONTINUE;
 
@@ -115,8 +110,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 #else
        authenticator = 1;
 #endif
-       /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
-        * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
        key_offset = authenticator ?
                NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY :
                NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -201,6 +194,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 {
        struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+       int i;
 
        ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
@@ -208,9 +202,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
                return TX_DROP;
 
        if (tx->extra_frag) {
-               int i;
                for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
-                       if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
+                       if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
                                return TX_DROP;
                }
        }
@@ -348,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
 }
 
 
-static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
+static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
 {
        pn[0] = hdr[7];
        pn[1] = hdr[6];
@@ -356,7 +349,6 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
        pn[3] = hdr[4];
        pn[4] = hdr[1];
        pn[5] = hdr[0];
-       return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03;
 }
 
 
@@ -371,7 +363,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
        if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
            !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
-               /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "
+               /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP
                 * header or MIC fields */
                info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
                return 0;
@@ -424,6 +416,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 {
        struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+       int i;
 
        ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
@@ -431,9 +424,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
                return TX_DROP;
 
        if (tx->extra_frag) {
-               int i;
                for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
-                       if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
+                       if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
                                return TX_DROP;
                }
        }
@@ -465,7 +457,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
            (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
                return RX_CONTINUE;
 
-       (void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+       ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 
        if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
                key->u.ccmp.replays++;
@@ -480,9 +472,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
                            key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
                            skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
                            skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
-                           skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) {
+                           skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
                        return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-               }
        }
 
        memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);