CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
index 652721ce0ea5ecd0bb19d53c519facf9a62026a6..293043a5573a201094e0cfe0f9245ba889ff3906 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  * Credentials
  */
 typedef struct cred {
-       /* EMPTY */
+       /* EMPTY */
 } cred_t;
 
 extern struct cred *sys_cred;

diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c
index d3438c72dcaf555b8d18174a00d1b6eab264615f..67c72aec97e6a96a2a6ff08e40d38d2abdf98dd0 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
         * to the file owner ID, except in cases where the
         * CAP_FSETID capability is applicable.
         */
-       if (current->fsuid != ip->i_d.di_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) {
+       if (current_fsuid() != ip->i_d.di_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) {
                code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
                goto error_return;
        }

diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
index b2f639a1416f0ecd1c0b91e4958584de823c3a46..91d69338d3b214c9ff8339217cf4834c842d6045 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ xfs_acl_allow_set(
                return ENOTDIR;
        if (vp->i_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
                return EROFS;
-       if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current->fsuid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+       if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current_fsuid() && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
                return EPERM;
        return 0;
 }
@@ -413,13 +413,13 @@ xfs_acl_access(
                switch (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
                case ACL_USER_OBJ:
                        seen_userobj = 1;
-                       if (fuid != current->fsuid)
+                       if (fuid != current_fsuid())
                                continue;
                        matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
                        matched.ae_perm = allows;
                        break;
                case ACL_USER:
-                       if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current->fsuid)
+                       if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current_fsuid())
                                continue;
                        matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER;
                        matched.ae_perm = allows;